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The Faulty Foundation of the Draft Restatement of 
Consumer Contracts 
Adam J. Levitin*, Nancy S. Kim**, Christina L. Kunz***, Peter Linzer****, 
Patricia A. McCoy*****, Juliet M. Moringiello†, Elizabeth A. Renuart‡ & 
Lauren E. Willis‡‡ 
Professor Gregory Klass’s replication study of the Draft Restatement of the 
Law of Consumer Contract’s empirical analysis of privacy policies found 
troubling and pervasive problems with the Reporters’ coding of cases. We 
extended Professor Klass’s study with a replication of the coding of the two 
largest datasets supporting the Draft Restatement, those on the enforceability of 
unilateral contract modifications and those on the enforceability of clickwrap 
assent. For the replication, we reviewed 186 cases blind to the Reporters’ 
coding. 
We found that nearly two-thirds of the cases in the unilateral modification 
dataset were irrelevant to the hypothesis tested by the Reporters. The irrelevant 
cases included business-to-business cases, vacated and reversed decisions, a 
duplicate decision, and cases determined on statutory grounds specific to credit 
card agreements. The remaining relevant cases were atypical, almost entirely 
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involving enforcement of arbitration clauses, express contractual clauses 
permitting unilateral modifications, or credit card agreements. 
Likewise, we found that nearly half of the cases in the clickwrap assent 
dataset were irrelevant to the Reporters’ tested hypothesis. The irrelevant cases 
included business-to-business cases, another duplicate decision, and cases with 
neither contracts nor clickwrap agreements. The overwhelming majority of the 
relevant cases involved the sui generis contexts of enforcement of arbitration 
clauses or forum selection clauses. Among such cases, we also found a 
materially higher rate of non-enforcement of clickwrap agreements than the 
Reporters found. 
Based on our attempt to replicate the Reporters’ coding, we lack confidence 
that the Draft Restatement correctly and accurately “restates” the law of 
consumer contracts. 
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Introduction 
Restatements of the law walk a line between being positive and normative 
projects. While Restatements purport to simply “restate” the law, that is to 
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summarize it,1 they inevitably involve choices about how the law is restated. At 
its most extreme, this might involve a choice between two alternative approaches 
taken by courts.2 But it can also involve more subtle questions of how to 
characterize the law. 
Restatements, however, are never wholly normative ventures. While they 
may have some normative elements, a Restatement not grounded in an accurate 
assessment of relevant case law has no legitimacy. Calling a project unmoored 
from actual case law a “Restatement” has the potential to mislead the ultimate 
users of Restatements—courts, litigants, legal scholars, and law students—who 
are unlikely to delve into the case law to verify the accuracy of the Restatement 
and are reasonably likely to assume it to be a true distillation of the common law. 
The prestige accorded to Restatements rests in the first instance on the 
reputation of the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI is a membership 
organization with over 4,500 members, consisting primarily of federal and state 
judges, law professors, and practitioners.3 Most ALI members are elected by the 
ALI’s governing Council following a nomination process; elected membership 
is capped at 3,000, with the remaining members serving as life, honorary, and ex 
officio members.4 The ALI holds that membership in the organization is “a 
distinct professional honor.”5 
The purpose of the ALI is “to promote the clarification and simplification 
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better 
administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific 
work.”6 To this end, the ALI sponsors, among other things, Restatements of the 
Law and “principles” projects, the latter being expressly more normative than 
Restatements. 
The ALI Restatement process cedes substantial control and direction of the 
project to the Reporters selected by the ALI Council, as experts in the area of 
law being restated. While the Reporters receive input from ALI members who 
are part of the Members Consultative Group and from Council-appointed 
Advisers, which include both ALI members and non-member experts,7 the 
Reporters control the drafting process, subject to the review and direction of the 
 
 1.   AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 3 (2015) (noting that 
Restatements “reflect the law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court”). 
 2.   For example, the Reporters would apply a more normative approach when precedent 
is inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a whole. In this case, the Restatement may “propose the 
better rule and provide the rationale for choosing it.” Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, 
Council Draft No. 5, at xi (Sept. 19, 2018) (hereinafter “Draft Restatement”). 
 3.   AM. LAW INST., MEMBERSHIP PROPOSAL PROCESS, 
https://www.ali.org/members/membership-proposal-process/. 
 4.   AM. LAW INST., ELECTION, https://www.ali.org/members/membership-proposal-
process/election/ [https://perma.cc/55SE-DRAX]. 
 5.   Id. 
 6.   AM. LAW INST., HOW THE INSTITUTE WORKS, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-
institute-works/ [https://perma.cc/6KPJ-WH7D]. 
 7.   Id. 
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ALI Council and ultimately subject to a vote by the ALI membership. Given that 
most members of the ALI Council lack expertise in the particular field of any 
Restatement (and this is especially true for Consumer Contracts, which is not the 
area of expertise of any current ALI Council member), the ALI process is 
founded on an assumption that the Reporters will carry out their duties 
competently and with fidelity to the purposes of the Restatement. 
For this reason, in our various roles as Advisers to or Members of the 
Members Consultative Group to the ALI Project on the Restatement of the Law 
of Consumer Contracts, we were greatly concerned when we read a summer 
2017 draft version of Professor Gregory Klass’s article, Empiricism and Privacy 
Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law.8 Professor Klass 
attempted to replicate one of the six empirical studies on which the draft 
Restatement of Consumer Contracts is based. He found that nearly two-thirds of 
the cases in the dataset were simply not relevant to the issue of whether privacy 
policies are contract terms. If correct, this would be an alarming error for a 
Restatement, one that goes to the fundamental legitimacy of the ALI’s 
Restatement process. 
Before receiving the Klass draft, some of us expressed concerns about the 
Reporters’ failure to recognize particular cases and about the precedential value 
accorded to certain rulings. Others expressed doubts about the Reporters’ use of 
a quantitative empirical methodology9—a novelty for Restatement projects. In 
addition, we were all skeptical of the particular normative approach of the draft 
Restatement. These concerns were the sort of disagreements that inevitably arise 
in a Restatement project. 
Professor Klass’s replication study raised the question of whether the draft 
Restatement’s quantitative studies were reliable even on their own terms, and 
thus whether the draft Restatement is plausibly a fair and accurate summary of 
the law. Accordingly, some of us attempted to validate Professor Klass’s study. 
We reviewed the cases in which Professor Klass’s coding differed from that of 
the draft Restatement. We concluded that Professor Klass’s readings were 
uniformly correct. 
Consequently, we extended Professor Klass’s replication study to the 
largest two of the other five datasets supporting the draft Restatement: the cases 
on contract modifications by businesses and the cases on clickwrap contract 
assent by consumers. Our findings are strikingly similar to the findings of 
Professor Klass in his replication study of the privacy policy dataset. Nearly two-
thirds of the cases cited as “contract modification” cases and nearly half of the 
cases cited as “clickwrap assent cases” are simply not germane. The datasets 
included duplicate cases, business-to-business cases, cases that were vacated or 
 
 8.   See Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer 
Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2019), for the publication version of the article. 
 9.   See id. This methodology is premised on counting the number of decided cases 
without regard to their precedential weight. 
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reversed, and cases not even involving contract disputes. These are not 
interpretive questions or instances where reasonable minds can differ. These are 
clear errors on a massive scale. These errors materially infect the Reporters’ 
interpretation of the case law and the ultimate positions taken by the draft 
Restatement. The extent of these errors raises questions about the accuracy and 
soundness of the entire project and has the potential to undermine the legitimacy 
of the ALI Restatement drafting process. We detail the methodology of our 
review and its findings below. 
I.  The Klass Study 
The draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts is built on a foundation of 
six empirical studies. Although the Reporters state that the six empirical studies 
merely supplement more traditional methods of discerning the “DNA of the 
law,”10 those studies are in fact the primary evidence for the draft Restatement’s 
wholesale revision of the standard rules of contract law in the consumer context. 
Specifically, these studies provide the basis for the draft Restatement’s 
normative move of eliminating the existing doctrinal requirements of meaningful 
consumer assent to contract formation and modification and replacing them with 
supposedly stronger litigation defenses: shifting consumer contract law from 
“hard to make, hard to break” to what will supposedly be “easy to make, easy to 
break.”11 
As stated supra, our concerns about the soundness of the draft 
Restatement’s empirical work originated with a summer 2017 draft of Professor 
Gregory Klass’s article.12 Professor Klass attempted to replicate one of six 
empirical studies that underlie the draft Restatement, namely the study that looks 
to whether courts treat stand-alone privacy policies as contract terms. Professor 
Klass uncovered that there are fundamental methodological flaws in the 
Reporters’ privacy policies study, as well as widespread misreading of cases. 
Ultimately, Professor Klass determined that of the forty cases on which the 
draft Restatement based its conclusion that privacy policies are contract terms, 
only fifteen of the cases are relevant to that issue, and all fifteen of these 
decisions are trial court rulings (mainly from federal district courts sitting in 
diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction). This raised the question of 
whether there is any germane, binding law in the area to restate. Likewise, 
whereas the draft Restatement asserts that there is a clear trend in the courts 
 
 10.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 6. See also the discussion infra in the Conclusion 
regarding the change in the Reporters’ claims about the role of the empirical studies in the draft 
Restatement. This discussion was added after the Reporters were presented with the findings of the Klass 
study and an initial version of our study. 
 11.   We have separately expressed concerns that the draft Restatement ignores the 
economic and procedural realities of consumer contract litigation, such that it would produce a “Hotel 
California” world of consumer contracts, in which contracts are “easy to make, hard to break.” 
 12.   See Klass, supra note 8, for the publication version of the article. 
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favoring treating privacy policies as contracts,13 Professor Klass concluded that 
there is no such trend. As Professor Klass explains: 
On the core question as to what most courts are holding, this study finds a much 
weaker effect (a less than a three-to-one ratio vs. a seven-to-one ratio) in a much 
smaller sample of cases (fifteen vs. forty). This is comparable to the difference 
between a baseball team winning eleven of its first fifteen games in a season and 
a team winning thirty-five of its first forty games. Both are winning records. But 
the latter win/loss ratio provides much more powerful evidence of the team’s 
ability and likelihood of success in the season as a whole.14 
The strength of judicial consensus is critical for determining whether there 
is a sufficient basis for a Restatement covering the topic at this time. Professor 
Klass’s study raised doubts about whether the draft Restatement accurately 
gauges the strength of that consensus when it comes to the treatment of privacy 
policies. 
The red flags raised by the Klass study called for a review of the other 
empirical studies underlying the draft Restatement. These studies are not mere 
illustrative ornaments buried in the Reporters’ Notes in “below the line” sections 
of the Restatement, but are foundational to the draft Restatement. The draft 
Restatement’s intellectual approach (originally styled as the “Grand Bargain”) is 
premised upon a belief that the doctrine of mutual agreement has already been 
largely jettisoned by the courts in the context of consumer contract formation 
and modification. The draft Restatement attempts to accommodate this supposed 
reality with a reinvigoration of certain contract defenses. In other words, the 
Grand Bargain is a tradeoff that jettisons meaningful assent to contract in 
exchange for supposedly stronger defenses to contract enforcement. As the draft 
Restatement portrays it, the precedent overwhelmingly reduces consumer assent 
to constructive pre- or post-transaction notice, and therefore any approach that 
seeks more meaningful assent futile.15 
Whatever one thinks of the draft Restatement’s Grand Bargain approach, 
its persuasiveness rests on a set of empirical assumptions. If courts have not 
clearly abandoned the requirement of mutual assent in favor of simple notice 
when assessing contract formation, then there is no Grand Bargain to make. 
Absent empirical support for its claim regarding the decline of mutual assent, the 
 
 13.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 15-17. 
 14.   Klass, supra note 9, at 50. 
 15.   We note that the Grand Bargain approach is fundamentally different from a simple 
“restatement” of the law. It is instead attempting to recalibrate the law by adjusting the balance between 
separate but interlinked legal issues. Distinct legal issues are often interlinked, such as liability rules and 
remedies or contract formation and defenses to contract enforcement. In such cases, a stricter rule on one 
issue might counsel for lenity on the other or vice-versa. Courts generally address only one of the 
interlinked issues at a time; they are not typically engaged in an explicit balancing act. The draft 
Restatement, however, is attempting such a normative calibration, which goes beyond a mere restatement 
of the law. 
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Grand Bargain is a wholly normative shift in contract law and hardly a 
“restatement.” 
II. Inadequacy of the Reporters’ Response to the Klass Study 
The Reporters responded to the Klass study with a brief memorandum to 
the ALI Council. That memorandum claimed that Council Draft No. 4 of the 
Restatement did not rest on the empirical findings of the six studies, that 
Professor Klass’s data are faulty because he does not count dicta (instead relying 
only on holdings), and that even if his data were correct, his conclusions are 
wrong because his study similarly shows that a majority of courts have treated 
privacy policies as contract terms.16 
These responses do not satisfactorily address the concerns raised by 
Professor Klass’s study. As an initial matter, it is imperative that the findings in 
the Restatement, including those located in the Reporters’ Notes, be able to 
withstand scrutiny. This is all the more so given the methodological novelty of 
quantitative empirical work in a Restatement. The ALI is perhaps the most 
widely-esteemed law reform organization in the United States, and its 
Restatements must reflect the highest standards in legal research. 
Second, the draft Restatement plainly rests on the empirical studies. The 
draft Restatement’s case counting method has enabled it to avoid engaging 
seriously with what it portrays as the rarely taken mutual agreement approach to 
consumer assent in contract formation and modification. Indeed, the draft 
Restatement’s empirical studies are the basis and justification for adopting the 
“Grand Bargain.” 
The foundational role of the empirical studies for the draft Restatement is 
most obvious regarding privacy policies. The inclusion of privacy policies within 
the framework of the draft Restatement is premised entirely on it being the 
majority position of courts; the draft Restatement does not advance any argument 
for treating privacy policies as contract terms, other than its claim that this is 
what courts are doing. 
Third, the Reporters’ claim that Professor Klass’s results differ from the 
draft Restatement’s findings because of the dicta/holding distinction is simply 
false.17 Professor Klass carefully explains that many of the cases in the privacy 
policies dataset are entirely inapposite, such as those not dealing with consumer 
 
 16.   Memorandum from Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler 
to the ALI Council Regarding Council Draft No. 4 of Restatement of Consumer Contracts 1-2 (Dec. 21, 
2017) (on file with authors). 
 17.   We understand that prior Restatements have considered dicta—and we think that it 
is appropriate in certain circumstances—but those prior Restatements have never conflated dicta and 
holdings in a case counting exercise; such case counting is a novel approach for a Restatement. In any 
event, the dicta/holding distinction is foundational to law and should not be ignored. As has been the 
ALI’s custom, the draft should be transparent about when and to what extent it relies on dicta rather than 
holdings. 
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disputes or contract disputes, or not involving privacy policies.18 Professor Klass 
explicitly notes that these cases contain neither relevant holdings nor relevant 
dicta.19 
Fourth, the Reporters’ response does not address Professor Klass’s first 
criticism—that almost all the cases cited were from federal trial courts sitting in 
diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction. We recognize that prior 
Restatements have considered federal opinions on matters of state law, but as far 
as we are aware, federal decisions on state law have previously been considered 
only as part of a mix with state court decisions. We are not aware of any prior 
Restatement of state common law that is based disproportionately on federal 
court decisions.20 
Finally, the Reporters’ observation that there are directionally similar 
findings between the Klass study and their privacy policies study is inadequate 
to the concern. It is not good enough for a Restatement to be merely directionally 
accurate. Every claim in a Restatement should be specifically accurate and 
supportable or the credibility of the enterprise suffers. Moreover, a weaker 
directional finding from a much smaller sample goes to the level of confidence 
one can have about the draft Restatement stating what the law is across the fifty 
states. This is especially true when the much smaller sample does not include a 
single state supreme court decision, as is true for the privacy policy cases. Nor 
does the Reporters’ response address the concern that similar coding issues might 
exist with the five other studies, where a replication might point in a different 
direction. 
III. Data and Methodology 
In light of the issues identified in the Klass paper, we requested that the 
data underlying all six studies supporting the draft Restatement be made 
available for review. The data were posted to a password-protected ALI website 
by the Reporters on October 31, 2017, in the form of six spreadsheets containing 
353 cases in all.21 Only ALI Members or Advisers have access to the data.22 
 
 18.   Klass supra note 9, at Part III (finding 26 of 51 decisions to be irrelevant to the 
hypothesis the Reporters tested). 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   This is true not only of the privacy policy cases, but of all six datasets of cases. 
Collectively, out of the 353 cases cumulatively listed in the six studies, only 103 (29%) are from state 
courts; 250 (71%) come from the federal courts. Moreover, 158 (45%) of the cases are unpublished. There 
were only 83 published state court opinions in all six datasets combined (24% of all cases). 
 21.   We note that 353 cases is a surprisingly small number of decisions nationwide over 
a period of around 35 years. The small number of cases points to the reality of consumer contract law: 
consumers seldom pursue their claims. The preponderance of arbitration enforcement decisions in the 
cases we reviewed (52% of those cases) also points to a second part of the reality: when consumers do 
pursue their claims, they are frequently compelled to arbitrate. This result contributes to the dearth of 
relevant judicial decisions. We also note that Council Draft No. 5, which was approved by the ALI Council 
in November 2018, contained several additional cases. The addition of these cases does not materially 
affect our analysis. 
 22.   We note the transparency concerns this practice raises regarding the ALI process. 
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The posting date left us with approximately six weeks to review the 353 
cases prior to the transmittal of Council Draft No. 4 and accompanying materials 
to the ALI Council. Given this abbreviated time schedule, we recognized that we 
could not realistically undertake a review of all the cases in the various datasets. 
Accordingly, we completed an investigation of only the two largest datasets: 
cases on contract modification (the “modification dataset,” containing 88 cases) 
and cases on clickwrap assent (the “clickwrap dataset,” containing 98 cases) 
within the time available. 
We undertook our review as a blind review, meaning that reviewers knew 
only the name and citation of the cases, not how the Reporters coded the cases. 
Although we are skeptical of the value of dicta, which tend to reflect statements 
on issues that were not fully briefed or considered by the court, we followed the 
Reporters’ convention in that we included both holdings and dicta. All cases 
were personally reviewed by Advisers and Members of the Consultative Group; 
no research assistants or associates were involved.23 
For the modification dataset, every case was reviewed by at least two of us, 
and in cases where the initial two reviewers disagreed on coding, by an additional 
reviewer. For the clickwrap dataset, every case was reviewed by at least one of 
us, with a second and sometimes a third reader for cases where we disagreed 
with the Reporters as to coding. For both datasets, we recorded additional data 
fields because of particular concerns about the nature of the cases. Our findings 
are reported below.24 
IV. Results 
A. Review of the Modification Dataset 
The draft Restatement says that “[t]he restated rules pertaining to the 
modification of standard contract terms are supported by an empirical study of 
all cases in state and federal courts addressing the enforceability of modifications 
in consumer transactions (excluding employment cases),” starting in 1981.25 The 
draft further states that “[t]he study includes 89 cases, including 37 unpublished 
cases.”26 
Our review found that 63% of the cases in the dataset were simply 
inapposite. Moreover, the dataset overwhelmingly consisted of cases involving 
an atypical situation: attempts to enforce arbitration clauses that were inserted 
 
 23.   Mr. George P. Slover, a member of the Members Consultative Group for the ALI 
Project on the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, also participated in the case review and 
was a signatory to the memorandum to the ALI Council on which this Essay is based. 
 24.   The findings we report here vary slightly from those we reported in a memorandum 
to the ALI because of further review we undertook in the course of turning our memorandum into an 
essay. 
 25.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 63-64. It appears that no cases decided after 
some point in 2015 were included. 
 26.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 64. 
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into credit cardholder agreements pursuant either to express change-of-term 
clauses or state statutes that expressly permitted this sort of contract 
modification. We also discovered that the datasets provided to us were, and 
remain, incomplete. 
1.  Almost Two-Thirds of the Cases in the Dataset Are Not Relevant 
Although the draft Restatement says that the modification dataset has 89 
cases,27 the dataset made available to us contained only 88 modification cases.28 
The modification dataset is used to support claims in the draft Restatement about 
when, under the common law, modified standard contract terms in a consumer 
contract are considered to be adopted (meaning when and whether a modification 
by a business of the terms in a standardized consumer contract is enforceable by 
the business). 
Of the 88 cases included in the dataset, 54 cases (61% of the total cases in 
the dataset) were plainly not relevant to the question of when modified standard 
terms are considered to be adopted in a contract: 
 
• 26 cases were decided based in whole or part on statutory grounds,29 such 
as state statutes that expressly permit unilateral changes in terms for 
credit card agreements by the card issuer. 
• 8 cases were determined not based on whether a modification was 
generally enforceable, but based on whether the particular substance of 
the contract clause was permissible.30 
• 5 cases did not involve a contract modification at all, as the court 
determined that there were separate contracts.31 
• 4 cases involved business-to-business disputes (and in one instance the 
modification was pursuant to a court order, rather than unilateral action 
 
 27.   Id. 
 28.   We also note that the modification dataset did not include fields relevant to the draft 
Restatement’s claims about the number of cases explicitly discussing the requirement of good faith or 
about how the modification was presented. 
 29.   A full citation list for these cases is appended as Appendix A. 
 30.   Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2008); 
Pokrass v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110441 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2008); Long v. 
Fidelity Water Sys., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7827 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2000); Saver v. Principal Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2849 (Mar. 21, 2002); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 
1094 (2002); Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442 (2006); Firchow v. Citibank, N.A., 2007 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178 (Jan. 10, 2007); Citibank, N.A. v. Walker, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
7199 (Sept. 11, 2008). 
 31.   Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Bassett v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 36175 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2015); Ekin v. Amazon Servs., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181912 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 10, 2014); Dottore v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102196 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 
10, 2010); Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
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by a party).32 A Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts cannot 
be founded on case law that does not involve consumers. 
• 3 cases were not formally decided on statutory grounds themselves, but 
simply followed, as stare decisis, cases determined on statutory 
grounds.33 
• 2 cases dealt solely with whether a modification could apply 
retroactively, not whether it could be enforced generally.34 
• 1 case involved a question of whether a contract that reserved a unilateral 
right to terminate was illusory, rather than the question of whether there 
was a binding modification.35 
• 1 case did not involve a modification issue because the modified contract 
was never entered into the record and was therefore never considered by 
the court.36 
• 1 case involved a consumer’s attempt to enforce a claimed modification 
against a business, rather than a business’s attempt to enforce a 
modification against a consumer.37 
• 1 case appears twice, being recorded at both the state appellate and state 
supreme court levels.38 
• 1 case had no ruling whatsoever regarding the enforceability of the 
modification, but instead reserved the issue for an arbitrator under the 
separability doctrine.39 
• 1 case was vacated.40 
Thus, we found only 34 cases41 that deal in their rulings or dicta with the 
general question of enforceability of unilateral modifications by businesses to 
 
 32.   Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2008); OTA v. Macerich CM 
Village, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11099 (Nov. 30, 2005); Panorama Residential Protective Ass’n v. 
Panorama Corp., 627 P.2d 121 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Koop v. Woodlake Trails Dev. Co., 549 N.W. 2d 
285 (Wisc. Ct. App., 1996). 
 33.   Eaves-Leanos v. Assurant, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32651 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 
2008); FIA Card Servs., Cardenas v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4599 
(May 26, 2006); N.A. v. Weaver, 62 So. 3d 709 (La. 2011). 
 34.   Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Cobb v. Ironwood Country 
Club, 233 Cal. App. 4th 960 (2015). 
 35.   Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 36.   McKee v AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845 (Wash. 2008). 
 37.   Lagen v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 774 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 38.   Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 810 A.2d 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002), aff’d 
by DIRECTV, Inc. v. Mattingly, 376 Md. 302 (2003). 
 39.   Cuadras v. MetroPCS Wireless, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156399 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
8, 2011). 
 40.   Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1491 (2006), vacated by Jones v. 
Citigroup, Inc., 171 P.3d 547 (Cal. 2007). 
 41.   One case, Klein v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Va. 2013), 
was subsequently reversed and remanded on appeal, Klein v. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc., 674 Fed. App’x. 
304 (4th Cir. 2017), but on remand the trial court, applying different law, reached the same outcome as in 
the original decision, Klein v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221585 (E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 
2017). We have consequently treated the original trial court ruling that is in the Reporters’ dataset as a 
germane decision, although it was formally reversed. 
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consumer contracts. Conversely, we also found in the course of our review a 
number of modification cases that were not included in the modification dataset, 
including cases that appear in one or more datasets for the other five studies 
underlying the draft.42 Thus, the draft Restatement includes irrelevant cases in 
the modification dataset even as it excluded relevant ones that were known to the 
Reporters. 
2.  The Few Remaining Relevant Cases Are Atypical 
Once the inapposite cases are removed from the dataset, the 34 remaining 
cases provide a much thinner basis for evaluating the law of contract 
modifications, as all but one of them involve at least one of three atypical features 
of contract modification situations generally. 
First, 28 of the remaining 34 relevant cases (82%) involve contracts with 
express clauses allowing unilateral changes of terms in some circumstances.43 
Courts are likely to analyze a case in which the parties have expressly contracted 
for one party to be allowed to unilaterally change terms according to a certain 
procedure differently than those that are silent on the matter. When these cases 
are litigated, the argument is often not whether a modification requires 
consideration or consent, but whether the particular modification was in good 
faith, or was unconscionable because of its substance and procedure, or whether 
the modification process complied with the terms of the unilateral change-of-
terms clause in the original contract. 
Second, 27 of the relevant 34 cases (79%) involved enforcement of 
arbitration clauses.44 Cases involving arbitration clause enforcement are 
substantively different from regular contract disputes because they are decided 
in the context of a federal statute and the resulting policy that strongly favors the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Moreover, many of these cases were decided 
prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion45 and 
followed now-preempted state case law making certain arbitration clauses 
unenforceable. As such, these cases were not squarely ruling on contract 
modification, but on the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 
 
 42.   These include: Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); 
Tsadilas v Providian Natl. Bank, 13 A.D.3d 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Anonymous v. J. P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26083 (S.D.NY. Oct. 29, 2005); Kulig v. Midland Funding, LLC, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161960 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013); In re Hood, 449 Fed. App’x. 507 (7th Cir. 
2011); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 43.   A full citation list for these cases is appended as Appendix B. Overall, 71 of the 88 
of the cases listed in the modification dataset (81% of the cases) had express unilateral modification 
clauses. 
 44.   A full citation list for these cases is appended as Appendix C. Overall, 69 of the 88 
cases listed in the modification dataset (78% of the cases) involved enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. 
 45.   563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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Third, 24 of the 34 on-point cases (71%) are credit card or deposit account 
cases.46 Cases involving credit cardholder agreements are atypical modification 
cases, because many states have statutes that specifically authorize unilateral 
changes in terms for credit cards with no additional consideration from the issuer 
and prescribe that only notice must be given to consumers (consumers need not 
agree to the changes).47 Courts frequently apply these statutes under choice-of-
law clauses in the contracts. In other words, these are not common law decisions, 
but statutory decisions. 
Even when courts do not look to statutory provisions in these cases, they 
have not consistently viewed the credit cardholder agreement as a contract. Some 
courts have treated the cardholder agreement as a solicitation, with a contract 
entered into via performance through use of the card, and each use of the card 
constituting a separate contract.48 Accordingly, no modification is involved. 
Moreover, even when courts have treated these cases as contracts, they (like 
deposit account agreements) are terminable at-will by either party. Therefore, a 
modification (unless retroactively applied) is substantively different than a 
modification of, say, a term lease or an annual service contract. 
These three sui generis categories are overlapping categories. Of the 24 
relevant credit card or deposit account cases, 22 (92%) involved express change-
of-terms clauses, and 21 (88%) involved attempts to compel arbitration, with 19 
(80%) involving attempts to compel arbitration clauses inserted pursuant to 
express change-of-terms clauses. 
Of the ten relevant cases that did not involve credit cards or deposit 
accounts, only one did not have an express change-of-terms clause, and only 
three were not about arbitration. 
All in all, there are no cases in the entire dataset that are relevant and do not 
involve a credit card or deposit account agreement, an express change-of-terms 
clause, or an attempt to compel arbitration. This is not an adequate basis for 
making any conclusions about the state of the law generally on the modification 
of consumer contracts. 
3.  Lack of Precedential Value of Cases 
Many of the cases in the modification dataset are unpublished or not for 
citation (including one case that was de-published).49 Such cases form a weak 
basis for ascertaining the state of the law. 
 
 46.   A full citation list for these cases is appended as Appendix D. Overall, 60 of 88 
cases listed in the modification dataset (68% of the cases) involved either credit card agreements (52 
cases) or various types of deposit account agreements (8 cases). 
 47.   E.g., 5 DEL. CODE ANN. § 952 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-11-9 (2019); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 97A.140(2) (2019). Delaware, South Dakota, and Nevada are home to nearly all major credit 
card issuers. 
 48.   E.g., Garber v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
 49.   39 of the cases listed in the modification dataset (44%) were unpublished; 49 were 
published. 
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Additionally, over two-thirds of the cases in the modification dataset 
involved courts applying the law of other jurisdictions, be it federal courts 
applying state law50 or state courts applying another state’s law.51 These 
decisions do not serve as binding precedent on other courts. 
The state court rulings in the total dataset (including irrelevant cases) are 
from only sixteen states, and only five state supreme court rulings are represented 
in the total dataset. More importantly, only ten of the relevant cases are state 
court decisions, with only a single decision from a state supreme court. This is 
too thin a basis for restating the common law across the fifty states. 
4.  Summary 
Our review of the modification dataset finds that well over half of the cases 
in the dataset should not have been included in the first place. We also find that 
of the remaining cases, virtually all contain one or more factors that render them 
poorly suited for generalizing a common law rule for consumer contracts. 
Finally, the cases overall frequently lack any precedential value and represent 
only a small minority of states’ law. 
B. Review of the Clickwrap Dataset 
The draft Restatement describes its empirical study on clickwrap-assent 
contracts as “a comprehensive empirical study of all cases in state and federal 
courts addressing the enforceability of clickwraps in consumer transactions 
. . . .”52 The draft Restatement further states that “[o]ut of a total of 98 cases, 
courts have enforced clickwraps in every case, absent fraud, unconscionability, 
or other intervening factors.”53 
1.  Nearly Half of the Cases in the Dataset Are Not Relevant 
The clickwrap dataset provided to us contained 98 cases. Of the 98 cases in 
the dataset, 45 (46%) were not relevant to the question of when courts will 
enforce clickwrap contracts in consumer transactions, for various reasons, 
including some for multiple reasons: 
 
 
 50.   54 of the cases listed in the modification dataset (61%) were decided by federal 
courts; 34 were decided by state courts. 
 51.   We did not consistently track this issue in our coding, which makes the 80% figure 
a conservative estimate. 
 52.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 44. 
 53.   Id. 
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• 23 cases were either business-to-business cases54 or employment 
cases. 55 Again, a Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts 
cannot be based on rulings in disputes that do not involve 
consumers if it is to be distinct from the existing Restatement 
(Second) of the Law of Contracts. 
• 11 cases did not involve questions of contract formation.56 
• 6 cases did not involve wrap contracts of any sort.57 
• 4 cases were not clickwrap, but scrollwrap cases.58 
• 2 cases did not involve a contract.59 
 
 54.   Superior Performers, Inc. v. Meaike, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50302 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 
11, 2014); Peters v. Amazon Servs. LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185964 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2013); 
Rassoli v. Intuit Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36433 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012); Kraft Real Estate 
Investments, LLC v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8282 (D.S.C. Jun. 13, 2012); Segal v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Siedle v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet Communication, Inc., 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20536 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011); Beard v. PayPal, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103075 
(D. Or. Nov. 5, 2010); CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. Field, 737 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D. Md. 2010); 
LTVN Holdings LLC v. Odeh, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103075 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2009); Novak v. Tucows, 
Inc., 73 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Hauenstein v. Softwrap Ltd, 2007 WL 
2404624 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007); Burke v. E-Bay, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100793 (W.D. Ark. 
Apr. 24, 2007); All Enthusiast Inc. v. Gunter, 2005 WL 1869395 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2005); Hotmail Corp. 
v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); Blue Bird, LLC v. Nolan, 
2009 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 9 (Apr. 28, 2009); Whitnum v. Yahoo! Inc., 16 Misc. 3d 1137(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2007); West Consultants, Inc. v. Davis, 310 P.3d 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). 
 55.   Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73426 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2013); 
Hill v. Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. La. 2011); Heath v. Travelers Cos., 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131422 (D. Minn. May 18, 2009); Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Pizzirani, 462 F. 
Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Newell Rubbermaid Inc. v. Storm, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 (Mar. 11, 2014); 
Forsyth v. First Trenton Indem. Co., 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1183 (Apr. 27, 2010). 
 56.   Agence France Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re iPhone 
Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011); CoStar Realty Information, 
Inc. v. Field, 737 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D. Md. 2010); Roling v. E*Trade Sec., LLC, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1179 
(N.D. Cal. 2010); A.V. v. iParadigms, Ltd. Liability Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008); Doe v. 
SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Davis v. Dell, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94767 
(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2007); Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016 (Wash. 2007); All Enthusiast Inc. v. 
Gunter, 2005 WL 1869395 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2005); Hopkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16414 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2004); Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Whitnum v. Yahoo! Inc., 16 Misc. 3d 1137(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 57.   Klein v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Va. 2013); Fluke 
v. Cashcall, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43231 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009); Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money 
Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); Bonck v. Vict. White & Progressive 
Sec. Ins. Co., 115 So. 3d 651 (La. Ct. App. 2013); Hodges v Condors Swim Club of Clarkstown, Inc., 
2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 574 (App. Div. Jan. 29, 2014); Minnick v. Clearwire U.S. LLC, 275 P.3d 1127 
(Wash. 2012). 
 58.   Scrollwrap requires a user to scroll through or view an agreement before being 
allowed to indicate acceptance, in contrast to clickwrap, which merely requires a click to indicate 
acceptance and not the actual viewing (even if in a cursory fashion) of the agreement. As courts grapple 
with modern consumer contracts, some have distinguished the treatment of scrollwrap and clickwrap. See, 
e.g., Applebaum v. Lyft, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (enforcing scrollwrap, but declining 
to enforce clickwrap). 
 59.   Nazaruk v. eBay, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66430 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2006); 
Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998). 
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• 2 opinions were from the same case, only one of which was 
relevant.60 
• 1 case merely held that there was a triable issue of fact about 
formation.61 
2.  Clickwrap Terms Were Not Consistently Enforced 
Of the 53 remaining apposite cases, the draft Restatement asserts that the 
clickwrap term was enforced in all but one case (2%).62 In contrast, our review 
found that 6 cases (11%) did not enforce the clickwrap term.63 (We agree with 
the draft Restatement regarding the one case in which it found the clickwrap term 
was not enforced.)64 Accordingly, there is a distinct minority position rejecting 
enforcement of clickwrap contracts. By denying the existence of this minority 
but important position, the draft Restatement avoids having to address the merits 
of the minority position, which is inconsistent with the draft Restatement’s 
“Grand Bargain.” 
3.  Lack of Precedential Value of Cases 
Over half of the cases in the entire clickwrap dataset are unpublished or not 
for citation.65 These cases are a weak basis for describing the state of the law. 
At least 80% of the cases in the dataset involved courts applying the law of 
other jurisdictions, be it federal courts applying state law66 or state courts 
applying another state’s law.67 These decisions, too, have no binding effect on 
other courts. 
 
 60.   Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Colo. 2012) (ruling on 
summary judgment); Grosvenor v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109884 
(D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2010) (ruling on motion to strike evidentiary declaration). 
 61.   Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 62.   The Reporters’ Notes state that “[o]ut of 98 cases, courts have enforced clickwraps 
in every case, absent fraud, unconscionability, or other intervening factors, such as insufficient notice.” 
Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 44. The Reporters’ coded dataset includes 98 cases, one of which was 
coded as not enforcing clickwrap. 
 63.   Grosvenor, 854 F. Supp. 2d 1021; Mazur v. eBay Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Brazil v. 
Dell Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59095 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2007); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of West Virginia v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586 (W.V. 2013). 
 64.   The one opinion coded as not enforcing a clickwrap is Grosvenor, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 109884. That opinion has nothing to do with contract formation; it was a ruling to strike an 
evidentiary declaration. The other opinion from the same case, Grosvenor, 854 F. Supp. 2d 1021, did not 
enforce the clickwrap term but was coded by the Reporters as having enforced the term. 
 65.   50 of the 98 cases listed in the clickwrap dataset (51%) were unpublished; 48 were 
published. 
 66.   78 of the 98 cases listed in the clickwrap dataset (80%) were decided by federal 
courts; 20 were decided by state courts. 76 of the federal court decisions were by district courts; only two 
were by courts of appeals. 
 67.   We did not consistently track this issue in our coding, but note that it appears to be 
a not infrequent phenomenon. 
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There are only 20 state court rulings in the entire dataset (including what 
we believe are inapposite cases). Those 20 decisions come from only 13 states, 
with published rulings from only 8 states. Only 9 of those state court decisions 
actually dealt with the enforceability of clickwrap contracts. Of particular note, 
there is no California state court decision in the dataset on clickwrap contract 
assent. Only three cases in the entire dataset were from state supreme courts, and 
only one of these cases addressed the enforceability of clickwrap assent.68 Again, 
as with the modification dataset, this is a very thin basis for restating the common 
law as developed across the United States. 
4. Nearly All Relevant Cases Involved Enforcement of Arbitration 
Clauses or Forum Selection Clauses 
Of the 53 remaining apposite cases, 21 (40%) involved enforcement of 
arbitration clauses and 25 (47%) involved the enforcement of forum selection 
clauses.69 In short, 87% of the remaining apposite cases involved disputes about 
where the litigation should be heard. Decisions on just two types of contract 
clauses, and particularly these similar types of clauses, provide a poor basis for 
generalizing rules of contract law. 
As discussed above, enforcement of arbitration clauses is decided in the 
shadow of a federal statute and the resulting strong policy preference favoring 
arbitration. Forum selection clause jurisprudence reflects the outsized influence 
of two Supreme Court cases, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company70 and 
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute.71 Both of these heavily criticized rulings arose 
in admiralty jurisdiction and have no formal binding effect on state law issues, 
per Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.72 Indeed, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and state attorneys general have brought a statutory “unfairness” action 
based on inconvenient forum selection clauses.73 Moreover, judicial economy 
concerns likely militate towards courts favoring enforcement of forum selection 
clauses that transfer litigation to other fora. 
5.  Summary 
Nearly half of the cases in the clickwrap dataset are simply not relevant for 
the proposition they are supposed to support, and the remaining cases are 
 
 68.   State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of West Virginia v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586 (W.Va. 2013). 
 69.   107 of the 186 cases (57%) in the two datasets involved attempts to enforce 
arbitration clauses. This suggests that the law of consumer contracts is primarily the law of enforcement 
of arbitration agreements, which is an area of law heavily shaped by the strong federal law preference for 
arbitration. 
 70.   407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 71.   499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 72.   304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 73.   Complaint at ¶¶ 62-68, 72-78, CFPB v. Freedom Stores, No. 2:14-cv-643 (E.D. Va., 
Dec. 18, 2014). 
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frequently sui generis, lack precedential value, and represent the law in only a 
small number of jurisdictions. For the relevant cases in this dataset, our findings 
are directionally the same as those reported in the draft Restatement, yet our 
findings show that there is an existing significant minority position: courts are 
not uniform in enforcing clickwrap contracts as the draft Restatement mistakenly 
claims. In addition, we are aware of one further case declining enforcement that 
was omitted from the dataset.74 
The dataset includes opinions through 2014. Since 2014, several courts 
have addressed in great detail the enforceability of clickwrap terms. One of those 
courts denied the enforceability of clickwrap terms in one of the most extensive 
and thoughtful considerations of the issue to date.75 Although that case, Berkson 
v. Gogo, LLC, was decided in April 2015, the Reporters failed to include any 
mention of it in their drafts dated October 2015, September 2016, December 
2016, April 2017, October 2017, and December 2017. The opinion made its first 
appearance in Council Draft No. 5, dated September 19, 2018.76 These omissions 
illustrate the Reporters’ reluctance to consider the merits of the minority 
position. 
Conclusion 
Based on our attempts to replicate the empirical studies of judicial 
treatment of consumer contract modifications and clickwrap assent plus our 
reexamination of the privacy policy cases, we lack confidence in the empirical 
reliability of the draft Restatement. While we recognize that there can be 
reasonable disagreements about certain coding decisions, the type of mistakes 
we have observed cause us grave concern about the reliability of the data used 
to support the Reporters’ conclusions. 
Notably, neither our study nor Professor Klass’s has been rebutted by the 
Reporters or anyone else. There is no replication study that confirms the 
Reporters’ coding of cases. At best, there is the Reporters’ argument that 
Professor Klass (and presumably by extension, we) have only looked at holdings 
and ignored dicta, but as noted above this is neither true nor relevant, as 
Restatements are built on law and not dicta. 
 
 74.   Scarcella v. America Online, 798 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2004), aff’d 811 
N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (refusing to enforce a forum selection clause). 
 75.   Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Other recent opinions 
that have refused to enforce clickwrap terms include Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F. 3d 53 (1st Cir. 
2018) and Applebaum v. Lyft, 263 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 76.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 39. The Reporters were aware of Berkson before 
they prepared their October 2015 Draft; the opinion was listed in the Supplementary Materials for the 
November 2015 meeting of the Advisers and Members’ Consultative Group but was incorrectly classified 
as a privacy policy opinion. See Preliminary Draft No. 2 Supplementary Materials, Empirical Analysis – 
Case Tables, p. 5, https://www.ali.org/smedia/filer_private/3c/66/3c66c78c-94e9-403b-9152-
ad28190d4c0b/consumer_contracts_-_supplementary_material_for_november_13_project_meeting.pdf. 
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In short, there is substantial, uncontroverted evidence of serious flaws in 
the Reporters’ reading of case law. Unfortunately, despite being aware of these 
concerns, the Council greenlighted the draft Restatement, approving the 
presentation of an amended version of the draft to the full ALI Membership at 
the May 2019 Annual Meeting, with the expectation of a vote at the meeting to 
adopt the Restatement. 
Professor Klass’s study was initially written against the background of 
Council Draft No. 3 of the Restatement, dated December 20, 2016. That draft 
touted the quantitative empirical methodology of the Restatement as a major 
innovation.77 The Reporters noted that “the quantitative approach bolsters the 
traditional qualitative approach with an added measure of comprehensiveness 
and transparency. Accordingly, in presenting the principles and rules of 
consumer-contract law, this Restatement relies on both methods.”78 
Council Draft No. 5, the latest draft of the Restatement, dated September 
19, 2018, no longer makes such methodological claims and generally downplays 
the role of the quantitative empirical studies, even though it arrives at precisely 
the same positions as the earlier drafts of the Restatement. The Reporters’ 
Memorandum to the ALI Council introducing Council Draft No. 5 notes that one 
of the primary changes in Council Draft No. 5 is that “[t]he black letter and 
Commentary of this Restatement do not reference the ‘counting’ methodology; 
the only reference to it is in the Reporters’ Notes.”79 In the place of the 
quantitative claims, the draft Restatement now claims that “the Reporters read 
the entire body of consumer-contract law decisions relating to the rules of this 
Restatement.”80 
Council Draft No. 5 is the first draft of the Restatement undertaken 
subsequent to the transmission of both the Klass study and an initial version of 
our study to the ALI Council.81 We read the Reporters’ substantial downplaying 
of their empirical claims and their shift to averring reliance on traditional 
doctrinal analysis in Council Draft No. 5 as their response to the coding issues 
we and Professor Klass have identified. 
Yet, given the patent and fundamental flaws in the Reporters’ case coding, 
the Reporters’ new claim to have discerned the law from reading “the entire body 
of consumer-contract law,” rather than from case counting, is not reassuring. 
Case counting requires coding of cases, and coding requires a close and careful 
reading of the cases. Given that the Reporters failed to accurately code a majority 
 
 77.   Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, Council Draft No. 3, Reporters’ 
Introduction at 5 (Dec. 20, 2016). 
 78.   Id. at 6. 
 79.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at xiii. 
 80.   Draft Restatement, supra note 2, at 6 (emphasis in original). It is not clear whether 
the “entire body of consumer-contract law” refers to the 353 cases in the six datasets, or to a larger body 
of law, the parameters of which are known solely to the Reporters. 
 81.   Council Draft No. 4 is dated December 18, 2017. We transmitted an initial version 
of our study to the Council and Reporters on December 19, 2017. 
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of the 186 cases we examined, it is difficult to credit their reading of the “entire 
body of consumer-contract law decisions” generally. And it is a remarkable 
coincidence that the Reporters arrive in Council Draft No. 5 at precisely the same 
substantive positions under their reformed approach as they did in previous drafts 
under the now debunked case counting methodology. 
We refrain from speculating here why the empirical studies underlying the 
draft Restatement are so riddled with errors or why the ALI Council would 
approve such a flawed product for a membership-wide vote. But we can say this: 
no Restatement should be premised on an unsound empirical foundation. A 
Restatement need not be based on a quantitative empirical analysis, but if it is, 
that quantitative analysis must be rock-solid in its coding of cases or it throws 
into question the soundness of the entire project. Based on our findings, we lack 
confidence that the draft Restatement correctly and accurately “restates” the law 
of consumer contracts. 
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Appendix D: Credit Card Cases 
 
